


















One of the most frequent sayings of 
the economist John Maynard Keynes is: 
‘Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist’ (Keynes, 1936: 383). 
That remark, in the conclusions to his 
great book, seems apposite now. Keynes, 
whose solution to the economic crisis of 
the 1930s was condemned as ‘defunct’ 
by many economists before the econom-
ic crisis of 2008, has secured much con-
temporary attention (Skidelsky, 2009), 
with that term applied to his monetar-
ist critics. On the other hand, writers are 
emerging who are inclined to apply the 
term defunct to both Keynesians and 
monetarists.
The quote from Keynes disarmingly 
sits within a wider justification of ‘ide-
as’ derived from economics: ‘I am sure 
that the power of vested interests is vast-
ly exaggerated compared with the gene-
ral encroachment of ideas’ (ibid.). With-
in contemporary policy analysis, the 
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OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
FROM A POLICY PROCESS 
PERSPECTIVE
Summary This article uses the paradigm shift theory to explore responses to the con-
temporary financial crisis. It comes to two conclusions, one conceptual, and the other sub-
stantive. It shows that it is difficult to use the paradigm shift theory to analyse events 
where policy change is slow, and in many respects a judgment about whether a shift has 
occurred is only possible retrospectively. It is suggested, however, that the notion of pa-
radigm shift helps to explain responses to a crisis in which there are problems about the 
applicability of conventional economic ideas, but strong reasons why changing them is 
likely to be resisted.
























theory of ‘paradigm shift’ in respect of 
ideas largely owes its origin to an ana-
lysis by Peter Hall of the replacement 
of Keynesianism by monetarism as the 
dominant perspective on the manage-
ment of the economy. This work then 
stimulated other work on what might be 
meant by a paradigm shift (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005) and on the importance of 
giving attention to ideas in the analysis 
of policy change (Béland, 2005).
So the central question for this pa-
per is: are we now witnessing another 
significant paradigm shift in respect of 
economic policy? Behind that question 
obviously lies a more important practi-
cal one: is a paradigm shift needed? This 
article by a political scientist, with some 
training in economics, offers reflections 
on the politics of the crisis, which of 
course involves choices between theo-
ries. The author is not altogether qua-
lified to offer judgements about the op-
posing macro-economic theories. Ne-
vertheless, there are important things 
to be said about contemporary politics, 
and about the extent to which the mak-
ing of choices between these theories 
seems now to be particularly difficult. 
This article builds upon one I wrote for 
an edited collection examining the ear-
ly stages of the economic crisis (Farns-
worth and Irving, eds., 2011). It updates 
that inasmuch as the crisis has changed 
its character, and probably deepened, 




... politicians, officials, the spokes-
men for social interests, and policy 
experts all operate within the terms 
of political discourse that are current 
in the nation at a given time, and the 
terms of political discourse general-
ly have a specific configuration that 
lends representative legitimacy to 
some social interests more than oth-
ers, delineates the accepted bound-
aries of state action, associates con-
temporary political developments 
with particular interpretations of na-
tional history and defines the con-
text in which many issues will be un-
derstood (Hall, 1993: 289).
As these comments indicate, the 
problem remains that institutional ana-
lysis may need to lay so strong an em-
phasis upon specific configurations of 
institutional situations and actors (in-
cluding ideas) that all it can offer is an 
account of past events, from which little 
generalisation is possible. 
We find a variety of efforts to deal 
with this problem. There have been at-
tempts to do this using concepts like 
‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier, 
1991) or ‘performance crises’ (March 
and Olsen, 1989). A more fully argued-
through exploration of this issue uses 
the concept of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
(Krasner, 1984; Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993). Surel argues that it is necessary to 
see exogenous influences as important 
for change processes. For him, ‘transfor-
mations of economic conditions, and/or 
a serious crisis’ are crucial (Surel, 2000: 
503). All these approaches still pose 
problems about the identification of cri-
ses and shocks. 
The word ‘crisis’ is used widely in 
popular discussions of economic and 
political problems. Chambers’ diction-
ary defines a crisis as ‘a crucial or deci-
sive moment; a turning point’. So ques-
tions must be raised about whether we 
are really at a crucial turning point. But 
then there still remains a question about 


















to occur. There is a certain tendency, to 
which observers of economic problems 
of a radical frame of mind are prone, to 
see evidence of problems within capi-
talist economies as symptoms of an 
emergent crisis that will lead to a trans-
formation of the existing order. Since 
economies are characterised by recur-
rent booms and slumps, there are diffi-
culties about determining if particular 
events are exceptional (a problem that 
has long generated pitfalls for Marxist-
type analysis).
There is a related issue here about 
the terms used to describe an econom-
ic crisis. To some extent the analysis of 
the present crisis has evolved since 2008 
through the following alternatives:
1. ‘Credit crunch’, implying a very tem-
porary disjunction;
2. ‘Recession’, often given an entirely 
arbitrary definition amongst econo-
mists of two or more quarters of ne-
gative growth;
3. ‘Depression’, implying a deep and 
long-lasting setback to the economy 
(note for example the title of Krug-
man’s book The Return of Depression 
Economics, 2008);
4. ‘Economic stagnation’, a view reject-
ing the extreme language of depres-
sion and pointing out that for many 
countries the situation is much less 
serious than in the 1930s, but ac-
knowledging that it is proving very 
difficult to re-establish significant 
economic growth (King, 2013).
However, inasmuch as there is con-
sensus about a crisis and thus a quest 
for solutions which are likely to embody 
new ideas, the concept of paradigm shift 
seems useful, particularly since its use 
in political science was pioneered in the 
context of an explanation of economic 
policy change. Hall explores the rise and 
fall of Keynesian economic dominance 
in government, seeing constraints not so 
much in structures as in dominant ideo-
logies, and charting how they change 
over time (Hall, 1986). Hall presents 
Keynesian economic theory and then 
monetarist theory as successive domi-
nant paradigms.
Paradigms may be seen as integrated 
clusters of ideas functioning, following 
Béland’s analysis of ideas:
• ‘as “cognitive locks” that help repro-
duce existing institutions and poli-
cies over time’;
• ‘as policy blueprints that provide 
political actors with a model for re-
form’;
• as ‘powerful ideological weapons’ 
that allow actors to challenge exist-
ing policies (2005: 125).
The assumption is then that the lat-
ter two considerations apply in a context 
of a crisis about the relevance of existing 
dominant ideas. 
But if we have difficulties with the 
concept of crisis, so too there are difficul-
ties about interpreting change. Streeck 
and Thelen (2005: 8; see also Kay, 2011) 
introduce two analytical considerations 
to try to deal with this. First, they ar-
gue that ‘we must avoid being caught 
in a conceptual schema that provides 
only for either incremental change sup-
porting institutional continuity through 
reproductive adaption, or disruptive 
change causing institutional breakdown 
and innovation and thereby resulting in 
discontinuity’. This leads them:
• to make a distinction between ‘incre-
mental’ and ‘abrupt’ change;
• to suggest alternative ‘results of 
change’, including the subsequent 
























cremental change as a gradual pro-
cess (ibid: 9).
Second, their emphasis on the in-
complete nature of institutional arrange-
ments leads them on to suggest a range 
of ways in which incremental change 
may occur:
• Displacement: the ‘slowly rising sali-
ence of subordinate relative to domi-
nant institutions’
• Layering: ‘new elements attached to 
existing institutions change their sta-
tus and structure’
• Drift: ‘neglect of institutional main-
tenance resulting in slippage of insti-
tutional practice on the ground’
• Conversion: ‘redeployment of old in-
stitutions to new purposes’
• Exhaustion: ‘gradual breakdown... of 
institutions over time’ (from ibid.: 
31, table 1.1). 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2009: 18) 
build on these ideas to develop the clas-
sification of types of change set out in 
figure 1.
However, what this highlights is the 
extent to which what is likely to be in-
volved is the analysis of change after it 
has occurred. If, exceptionally, an earth-
quake is occurring, that may be evident 
right now, but if a stalactite is growing, 
we will only be able to measure it in time 
to come. Hence, before attempting to 
analyse contemporary events it is appro-
priate to ask how easy is it to use this ap-
proach to explain previous changes that 
have been labelled ‘paradigm shifts’ for 
economic policy: the so-called ‘Keynes-
ian revolution’ of the 1930s and 1940s 
and the events of the 1970s and 1980s 
that Hall analysed. Before embarking on 
this, an important qualification is neces-
sary. While there were related or parallel 
events in many countries, what I am able 
to offer is comments on events affect-
ing the United Kingdom. To cast the net 
more widely for a simple preliminary ac-
count, helping to explain the problems 
about applying these ideas to contempo-
rary events, would be too difficult and 
space-consuming.
The Crisis of the 1930s in the UK
The essential facts, in respect of the 
UK, were reverberations from a stock 
market crash in the United States in 
1929, a sequence of stock market distur-
bances in both countries and elsewhere 
in the years immediately following it, 
and then a severe recession to which the 
label depression is commonly applied. 
Few economic indices are available 
from that era, but unemployment sta-
tistics show a very deep trough lasting 
for five or six years, followed by a very 
Figure 1
Result of change
 Within path (incremental) Radical/ transformation 
Gradual A. Classic incrementalism B. Gradual eventually fundamental change
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slow recovery. In the end it was prepa-
ration for war that began to make a real 
difference. Whilst the 1930s saw a grow-
ing debate about alternative approach-
es to management of the economy, the 
impact of this on policy outcomes was 
slow (see Clarke, 1988). Keynes’ semi-
nal contribution to that debate, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, was published in 1936, but 
he had of course been actively advocat-
ing new policies for some time before 
that. 
Robert Skidelsky, the leading bio-
grapher of Keynes, argues that ‘The Ge-
neral Theory advanced one main pro-
position: that a decentralised market 
economy lacks any gravitational pull to-
wards full employment. Consequently, it 
is as likely to be in a state of underem-
ployment as of full employment’ (2009: 
97). Elaborating, Skidelsky goes on to 
say: ‘The collapse of optimistic expec-
tations causes the economy to collapse; 
once established, pessimistic expecta-
tions cause unemployment to persist. 
This is Keynes’ famous “underemploy-
ment equilibrium”. Government should 
manage demand to limit fluctuations to 
the smallest feasible amount’ (ibid.). 
That in essence is the Keynesian in-
terpretation of what was going wrong 
in the 1930s and it is generally accepted 
that this became the dominant view of 
that period by the end of the 1940s, and 
in that sense the dominant paradigm. 
But in placing the dominance of the pa-
radigm in the late 1940s, it is important 
not to forget the transformative impact 
of the 1939-1945 War in stimulating a 
debate about what went wrong in the 
1930s. That debate occurred, moreover, 
at a time after a much more controlling 
role for government had been accepted 
as a necessity during the war.
It is important to acknowledge, 
viewed from a much later date, that 
the Keynesian interpretation is not the 
only interpretation of the events that 
occurred in the 1930s. The alternative 
– broadly speaking ‘monetarist’ – in-
terpretation accepts the underlying ‘de-
ficient demand’ assumption of Keynes’ 
approach, but sees the mistake made by 
the governments of the time to be their 
perverse response to the under-supply of 
money (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). 
In this respect Gamble says: ‘One lesson 
that Friedman, Bernanke and many oth-
ers took from the Great Depression was 
that never again must central banks con-
tract the money supply in response to a 
major crash and risk a major deflation-
ary spiral’ (2009: 56).
But this is not to say that, in essence, 
there is nothing to choose between the 
Keynesian position and that taken by 
Friedman and other monetarists. Obvi-
ously there lies here a proposition that 
cannot be tested as to whether the events 
of the 1930s would have been very dif-
ferent if the central bankers had behaved 
differently. The Keynesian view is that 
such a response would have been inade-
quate. But there are here two other dis-
tinctions between the perspectives. One 
is that it is important to note what a cen-
tral place concern about unemployment 
takes in the Keynesian analysis. By con-
trast, we find the monetarists arguing 
at a later stage in history for something 
Keynes explicitly rejected: the pushing 
down of the price of labour. Secondly, 
where monetarism sees government (or 
even in more modern times quasi inde-
pendent central banks) simply needing 
to take measures to adjust the supply 
of money, Keynesianism gives a much 
more strongly interventionist role to 
























lation to the creation of work. A distinc-
tion is drawn here between the former 
as ‘monetary policy’ and the latter as ‘fis-
cal policy’, involving much more expli-
cit economic stimuli from governments.
There is something else to be said 
here about Keynes’ approach, which is 
of considerable importance for analy-
ses of the contemporary crisis; this is 
his emphasis on uncertainty. Keynes’ 
earlier work on probability theory may 
be seen as critical of the positivism that 
has come to dominate modern econom-
ics. Skidelsky (2009) emphasises Keynes’ 
stress upon ‘uncertainty’ rather than 
risk. In this sense, The General Theory 
can be seen as trying to arm policy mak-
ers to deal with the consequences of un-
predictable crises rather than assisting 
them to prevent them. Skidelsky goes on 
to draw upon this emphasis in Keynes’ 
theory for a strong attack on modern 
economic modelling where variation is 
seen in terms of ‘risk’ and temporary de-
viation from market discipline in terms 
of the use of statistical ideas around the 
concept of the normal curve. Skidel-
sky’s analysis is interestingly echoed in 
a contribution to the modern debate by 
an economic journalist, John Cassidy 
(2009), who sees many of the assump-
tions about self-correcting markets, and 
the positivist modelling that reinforces 
this, as contributions to the contempo-
rary crisis. 
The Counter-revolution: 
The ‘Rejection of Keynesianism’ 
Taking into account the ambiguity 
of what is today described as Keynesi-
anism, inasmuch as this became a crude 
label for most attempts to managing lev-
els of investment, even if only through 
controls over the money supply, it may 
be exaggerating to say that there was a 
complete rejection of Keynesianism. 
However, there was, from the mid-1970s 
onward, a revival of classical economic 
ideas in a period in which inflation was 
seen to be a more serious problem than 
unemployment. Interestingly, in the UK 
it was a Labour Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan, who told his party’s confe-
rence in 1976: 
We used to think that you could 
spend your way out of a recession 
and increase employment by cut-
ting taxes and boosting government 
spending. I tell you in all candour 
that that option no longer exists... 
(quoted in Cassidy, 2009: 79).
However, the decisive change to the 
political climate occurred following the 
election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 in 
England and of Ronald Reagan in 1980 
in the United States. 
Any full explanation of how this 
counter-revolution occurred needs to 
embrace:
• consideration of the extent to which 
there was a ‘crisis’ in respect of eco-
nomic management, exposing the 
inadequacies of existing policies,
• evidence that there was a coherent 
alternative waiting in the wings,
• and – here we reach a crucial issue 
about the paradigm shift theory – 
powerful actors able to push that al-
ternative.
The ‘crisis’ in question consisted of 
evidence of increasing difficulties in re-
spect of the Keynesian approach to the 
management of the economy. There had 
been long-standing concerns about the 
difficulties in securing economic growth 
without inflation, manifested in what 
were seen as ‘stop/go’ effects as govern-
ments shifted to and fro between eco-


















the 1970s the phenomenon of stagflation 
emerged (recession and inflation at the 
same time, a phenomenon that Keynes-
ian theory seemed to deem impossi-
ble). In retrospect, hikes in oil prices at 
times when national economies were in 
recession seem to have been an impor-
tant contributor to this problem. But at 
the time the main culprit was seen to 
be trade union power, pushing up wage 
costs regardless of the overall economic 
situation. In this respect – particularly in 
the UK – the new Right’s commitment 
to curb union power may be seen as a 
central aspect of the new economic po-
licy; the adoption of devices to unleash 
market forces were seen as key contribu-
tions to achieve this effect. We can thus 
explicitly see the counter-revolution as a 
re-run of the arguments between expo-
nents of classical economics and Keynes, 
in which he argued that letting the free 
play of the market reduce the cost of la-
bour would have the perverse effect of 
increasing a recession.
Hence, in some respects the alterna-
tive ‘waiting in the wings’ was a group 
of economists expounding classical the-
ory, above all reviving the work of one 
of Keynes’ opponents, Hayek. Peter Hall 
is not alone in demonstrating how this 
neo-liberal movement in economics 
grew in strength and organisation and 
won the support of financial journalists 
and politicians in the 1970s (see also Par-
sons, 1989). We can thus see, in terms of 
Kingdon’s policy agenda-setting theory 
(1995), the coming together of a ‘prob-
lem’ and responding ‘policies’ from this 
increasingly effective group of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’. Need we then merely say 
that Kingdon’s third ingredient for suc-
cessful policy adoption (‘politics’) came 
in the form of the election of new more 
ideological politicians of the Right?
Questions have been raised, in re-
spect of the paradigm shift theory, about 
the extent to which it does justice to 
concerns to explore the power of policy 
change advocates (Béland, 2005). Hall’s 
analysis of the rise of monetarism ad-
dresses this problem. What he shows is 
that, at the time, the financial markets 
(in the City of London and worldwide) 
were changing: 
... a series of changes in the institu-
tional practices of the markets for 
government debt (the gilt markets) 
that happened to occur in these years 
substantially reinforced the power of 
markets vis-à-vis the government 
(Hall, 1992: 100).
These changes were partly induced 
by the removal of government controls. 
Interestingly, they were also reinforced 
by the arrival in the City of a new ge-
neration of experts with training in eco-
nomics, and by the development of in-
formation-processing capacity which 
enabled the City to be better (and more 
quickly) informed about public policy 
and its impact.
The Contemporary Crisis
The contemporary crisis started with 
bank failures in 2008 particularly asso-
ciated with indiscriminate lending for 
house purchase in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Complicated 
forms of debt purchase, which had been 
deemed to spread the risk of what were 
known as sub-prime mortgages, unrav-
elled, leaving banks exposed with mas-
sive liabilities that they could not meet. 
While some of the institutions, notably 
Lehmann Brothers in the United States, 
collapsed, governments moved to try to 
prevent widespread bankruptcies by of-
























ly taking over – vulnerable banks. The 
credit crisis then had substantial knock-
on effects, undermining business confi-
dence and generating a massive fall in 
economic activity:
The IMF (2010) estimated that fi-
nance-led recession had resulted 
in more than 30 million job losses, 
most of them in the developed eco-
nomies. The immediate policy coun-
ter was fiscal stimulus packages at 
national level so that, by late 2009, 
governments from the United States 
and China to Spain, France, and 
Germany had committed themselves 
to extra public expenditure of ap-
proximately $3 trillion (Engelen et 
al., 2011: LOC 4562-66).
Initially the expectation was that 
swift action by governments would 
bring the situation under control, but 
soon it became clear that economic re-
covery would not come quickly. Serious 
financial crises generate what are called 
‘sovereign debt crises’, involving increa-
ses in public sector debts (see Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009). In the contemporary 
case, routes ‘from financial crisis to fiscal 
crisis’ (Gough, 2011: 53) comprised go-
vernment interventions to stave off bank 
collapses, stimulus measures adopted to 
try to prevent ‘a major depression in the 
real economy’ (ibid.: 54) and, as the re-
cession set in, combinations of falling 
tax revenues and increased social ex-
penditure (on benefits for unemployed 
people, etc.).
It became clear that a return to eco-
nomic growth was not going to come 
easily and that in the meantime many 
governments had high and increasing 
levels of debt:
... European political elites in 2010 
rediscovered their belief in fiscal 
prudence and began to plan pub-
lic expenditure cuts. Their increas-
ing public debts were subject to 
the judgement of the bond markets 
which decided the terms on which 
national governments could refi-
nance their debt, given that Europe-
an governments could not make the 
US assumption that the rest of the 
world would keep their bond mar-
kets going (Engelen et al., 2011: LOC 
4567).
A conflict had emerged between 
the need to re-stimulate economies and 
the need to curb the growth of govern-
ment debt. Within the Eurozone an ad-
ded complication was the way in which 
a common currency linked economies, 
though it may be argued that the way in 
which this limited the adoption of re-
medies in specific nation states (particu-
larly currency depreciation) was an ex-
treme version of the general problems 
stemming from global economic links.
Diagnosing the Problem: 
Towards a Paradigm Shift?
Soon after 2008 an extensive lite-
rature on the economic crisis emerged 
with a strong focus upon the extent to 
which its roots lay in aspects of the free-
ing of the markets in the 1970s. Analy-
ses by Haseler (2008), Skidelsky (2009) 
and Cassidy (2009) are particularly in-
teresting in this respect for their empha-
sis upon the extent to which monetar-
ism involves a dogma about markets, 
reinforced by the emergence of an eco-
nomics profession whose theorising is 
trapped within assumptions about ra-
tionality in this context. Hence, a debate 
developed about the extent to which 
there is a case for a reversal of the para-



















There was initially a, comparatively 
consensual, focus on the banking cri-
sis, seeing the issues about speculation 
and the excessive extensions of cred-
it in the period leading up to the crisis 
as events that should dominate any at-
tention by governments. Policy changes 
recommended involved the imposition 
of better controls over speculative ac-
tivities, particularly by ‘ordinary’ banks. 
There were some signs that prompt go-
vernment action had forestalled a seri-
ous crisis, and that ‘normality’ would re-
turn quickly. Those who accepted this 
scenario saw no reason to support a pa-
radigm shift.
This point of view was challenged 
by a second scenario that involved re-
cognition of parallels with the 1930s. 
It is interesting to note Samuel Brittan 
– one of the gurus of the earlier rise of 
monetarism – attacking those who saw 
‘green shoots’ of economic recovery in 
the spring of 2009 and quoting Keynes 
on the need to encourage public and 
private investments (Financial Times, 
26/06/09). Krugman and Wells, in a re-
view article, drawing upon Reinhart and 
Rogoff ’s book with the ironic title This 
Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Fi-
nancial Folly (2009), argued: ‘... the af-
termath of financial crises tends to be 
nasty, brutish and long. That is, finan-
cial crises are typically followed by deep 
recessions, and these recessions are fol-
lowed by slow, disappointing recoveries’ 
(New York Review of Books, May 2010). 
By 2010, the evidence that govern-
ment debt burdens were considerable 
and were growing began to change the 
terms of the debate. The dominant poli-
cy perspective stressed the need for pub-
lic sector austerity. In the UK, the Con-
servative-led coalition that had replaced 
the Labour government in June 2010 in-
troduced substantial public sector ex-
penditure cuts. The Labour opposition 
opposed these, but only with claims that 
the cuts should be made more gently 
and more slowly. It is interesting again to 
note Samuel Brittan still arguing in May 
2010, despite his general support for the 
new government, that the issues about 
UK government debt had been exagger-
ated, drawing on evidence about its long 
run maturity (meaning that there is little 
pressure for rapid repayment) and cit-
ing the director of the International Mo-
netary Fund on the need to take care to 
ensure that corrective measures did not 
damage the recovery (Financial Times, 
20/05/10).
However, since 2010, across Europe 
and the United States at least, there has 
been little sign of an economic recovery. 
In this context austerity policies have 
not been effective in checking govern-
ment deficits (the crucial problem here 
being the combination of low tax yields 
and high social benefit needs described 
above). This seems to strengthen the 
case for a much more effective reversion 
to the Keynesian paradigm. Paul Krug-
man is forthright on this point:
Now is the time for the government to 
spend more, not less, until the private 
sector is ready to carry the econo-
my forward again – yet job-destroy-
ing austerity policies have instead be-
come the rule (Krugman, 2012: 1).
We may well ask why there has not 
been wider acceptance of that view. There 
are several possible answers to that. It is 
implicit in the institutionalist view of 
policy change that the forces in favour of 
the status quo will remain strong. It may 
be argued that there has been some fu-
sion of Keynesian with monetarist views 
inasmuch as the key reflation device 
























low interest rates. There have been diffi-
culties in sustaining this, since when real 
interest rates (discounting for inflation) 
reach zero, they can go no lower. New 
ways of making money available have 
then been tried, notably what is called 
‘quantitative easing’. At the time of writ-
ing, doubts are being raised about the 
effectiveness of this. Something more 
seems to be needed to restore commit-
ments to investment. For Keynes, state 
investment was the answer. But this im-
plies increasing the public sector deficit. 
Since in the 1930s it was the coming of 
war that made all the difference in that 
respect, it may be doubted whether the 
Keynesian message on this was ever re-
ally fully accepted. 
However, there seem to be two other 
problems about efforts to persuade po-
licy makers to accept Krugman’s strong 
endorsement of the Keynesian view. 
First, it may be noted that in the quote 
above ‘the government’ is in the singular. 
Krugman, whilst wanting to offer a ge-
neral message, is writing above all to per-
suade policy makers in the United States. 
His country is large and powerful, it can 
much more easily operate as an auto-
nomous economy than most other coun-
tries. There are two senses in which it 
can sustain increased indebtedness. One 
is that a substantial part of its lenders 
can be its own citizens, responding to a 
need to entrust resources to the govern-
ment in the national interest. The other 
is that even foreign investors may regard 
a large economy as a safe place to depos-
it savings (as indeed the Chinese did in 
the period leading up to 2008). Hence it 
may be argued that for many countries 
a wholehearted Keynesian approach to 
stimulating the economy is ruled out by 
a lack of economic autonomy. This par-
ticular pitfall in Krugman’s approach 
is only overcome if the commitment is 
made by a large economic unit (the EU 
rather than individual countries), or is 
indeed a universal one. Again it is per-
tinent to go back to the difference be-
tween the present and the 1930s, with a 
particular salutary reflection that in that 
earlier period there were strong political 
moves towards trying to insulate econo-
mies from each other. These have been 
explicitly repudiated since 1945, indeed 
the last contribution of the dying Keynes 
was to assist with the development of in-
ternational policies that would prevent 
this happening (see Skidelsky, 2000).
The second point is that, even with 
these qualifications, there is a need to 
have regard to the time dimension. 
The way Keynesian management of the 
economy was seen in the immediate 
post-war period was in terms of short-
term adjustments. The notion of steer-
ing (as with a car) is appropriate here. 
For lenders to countenance increased 
indebtedness, there is a need for them to 
see that the road will eventually straight-
en out, to recognise that in the long run 
they will get their money back. The 
question now is where such confidence 
will come from. There are good grounds 
for doubting, as Keynes did, the cheerful 
economic model of the self-correcting 
system. Moreover, as noted above, the 
actual route out of trouble in the 1930s, 
war, does not offer a happy precedent.
This leads on to questions about 
whether new paradigms are needed that 
break away from both Keynesians and 
monetarism. In reviewing this, it is use-
ful to start with the perspective of a new 
book by an economist working for one 
of the big banks. Stephen King argues:
Many of the factors that led to such 
scintillating rates of economic ex-


















lier decades are no longer working 
their magic (2013: 2).
Later he says: ‘The West appears to 
be suffering a structural deterioration 
in economic performance’, and goes on 
to describe the ‘stimulus versus auster-
ity debate’ described above as out of date 
(ibid.: 3). Then he notes:
Oddly, the protagonists on both 
sides believe in much the same thing, 
namely that the appropriate macro-
economic policies will ultimately de-
liver a return to the growth rates of 
old (ibid.).
He goes on to challenge this view 
with a mixture of evidence on why a re-
turn to high growth rates will be hard 
to achieve: the exceptional character of 
the high growth rates of the post-Second 
World War period, and the evidence that 
the efforts to sustain them through the 
extension of credit lay at the heart of the 
2008 crisis and the changed global eco-
nomy.
King does not identify himself with 
the Green literature which suggests rea-
sons why judging economic perfor-
mance in terms of growth may be prob-
lematical (see for example Jackson 2009; 
Simms, 2013), let alone with those who 
stress a need to seek other indicators of 
economic success such as happiness (see 
the discussion in Skidelsky and Skidel-
sky, 2012) or the reduction of inequality. 
However, he joins a number from out-
side the ranks of the more radical cri-
tics of modern economies who are rais-
ing questions about what is meant by 
growth and about where such growth 
can come from.
In the United States Robert J. Gordon 
(2012) has noted a number of factors 
that are tending to drag down growth. 
In the UK Adair Turner, a leading advi-
sor of business and government, has set 
out reasons why indices of growth are 
unsatisfactory measures of government 
performance. He points out: ‘The richer 
we get, as measured by per capita GDP, 
the more arbitrary and uncertain some 
of the conventions required to calculate 
GDP become’ (Turner, 2012: LOC 438), 
and goes on to argue that ‘GDP figures 
are almost useless as measures of long-
term changes in human well-being. 
Even as measures of long-term changes 
in what we think as “real income” they 
are highly imperfect, because they de-
pend on conventions and assumptions 
that are to a degree arbitrary’ (ibid.: LOC 
1461). 
There are questions to be raised 
about the extent to which the credit cri-
sis emerged from the masking of an im-
balance between the expectations of 
consumers and competitive productive 
capacity in the US, UK, etc. Growth de-
pending upon borrowing, in a context 
in which there was little real new in-
vestment but rather a variety of ways of 
moving around other people’s money, 
was illusory. Implicit to both monetarist 
and Keynesian thinking is a search for 
new ways of stimulating investment. But 
are these feasible? The emergent econo-
mies (Chinese above all, but also India, 
Brazil and more to come) are transform-
ing the world economic system. There 
are reasons for questioning the notion 
that it is simply a matter of finding new 
and better ways in which the established 
capitalist economies can compete with 
these new economies. An economics in 
which growth (in respect of GDP) is the 
yardstick of satisfactory national perfor-
mance needs to be challenged. But what 
that means for the citizens of the hither-
to dominant economies, and their gov-
ernments, is finding ways of coping with 
























Finally, there are issues to be raised 
about the relationship between success-
ful growth and job creation. In the UK 
there has been a certain amount of self-
congratulation on the part of the go-
vernment about the avoidance of dra-
matic increases in unemployment as the 
austerity strategy develops. However, it 
may be that significant elements of un-
der-employment are being masked (par-
ticularly the growth of part-time work). 
It seems likely too that the incomes of 
the employed are falling in the context 
of efforts to maintain national compe-
titiveness. An important difference be-
tween the 1970s and the present is the 
weakness of trade unions, no longer 
able to challenge measures that reduce 
incomes. In general, however, levels of 
unemployment have becomes massive 
across Europe, particularly Southern 
Europe, and the prospects for changing 
this situation look grim. In the 1930s, 
Keynes pointed out that simply driving 
down wages does not solve this problem. 
Today we may also point out the politi-
cal limitations of such a strategy.
Conclusions: Are Paradigm Shifts 
Occurring?
Ideological change is a slow pro-
cess. In the 1970s, as was noted, the 
shift away from Keynesianism involved 
a shift back to earlier ideas, which had 
been kept alive and indeed increasing-
ly strongly promoted in the early part 
of that decade. Obviously similar points 
may be made about any reversion to 
Keynesianism now. But as already not-
ed, what is perhaps happening is some 
fusion of Keynesianism and monetar-
ism, which was in any case always going 
on. A related point concerns the quest 
for new ways of ordering international 
relations. Here, as noted, the reference 
point in the past is the Bretton Woods 
conference at the end of the Second 
World War, where Keynes had to com-
promise strongly with American domi-
nance. The characteristic of the post 
1970s order was the reinforcement of 
that dominance in a context of efforts 
to minimise constraints on markets. 
Here critics are in evidence, with Stiglitz 
(2010) the key figure. 
But what are the prospects for change 
beyond this? Stephen King’s analysis of 
the situation poses a series of problems 
for the stimulus perspective, but he is 
forthright in his support for measures to 
reduce government indebtedness. His is 
an argument that the West is living be-
yond its means, with messages both to 
citizens and to governments. Critical as 
he is of the concept of economic growth, 
Adair Turner notes: ‘... indebtedness 
does create a growth imperative. With-
out growth, debt servicing and debt re-
duction require expenditure reductions 
and tax increases, which impose resent-
ed and resisted setbacks to people’s ex-
isting income and wealth’ (Turner, 2012: 
LOC 1471). Remedies thus require a 
lowering of expectations, always diffi-
cult for democratic politics to deliver.
More radical voices from the Green 
perspective have a massive task on their 
hands challenging productivist and 
growth assumptions in convention-
al economic thinking and translating 
them into political discourse. It may be 
doubted whether ‘happiness’ measures 
(see Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012) can 
become a ‘currency’ of political debate, 
resting as they do on comparatively ‘soft’ 
measures derived from psychological 
testing.
Central to radical change has to be 
something more than the imposition 


















noted the rise of this interest in relation 
to the paradigm shift of the 1970s. There 
seems little evidence so far of a signifi-
cant reversal here. On the contrary, the 
battles over bankers’ bonuses and the 
continuing development of hedge funds 
suggest nothing much is changing. Im-
plicit in change is that there has to be a 
changed relationship between govern-
ment and the financial sector (the Trea-
sury and the City in UK discourse). At 
the time of writing, the dominant view 
is that government deficits must be cut 
for fear of market reactions:
Elite politicians in many coun-
tries make speeches that rhetorical-
ly underscore their commitments 
to reforming finance and caging its 
private interests, but all this is effec-
tively undermined if they accept the 
story ... that any reform must be ac-
ceptable to finance (from Engelen et 
al., 2011: LOC 3725).
This article has used the para-
digm shift theory to look at contempo-
rary economic events: to ask whether 
we can see (or indeed whether we will 
see) shifts in economic policy compara-
ble to those that occurred either when 
Keynesian ideas were first adopted or 
when there was a reaction away from 
them in the 1970s. In doing that, it sug-
gested that it is important not to exag-
gerate the changes involved in those past 
events. It has also indicated some prob-
lems about the notion of paradigm shift. 
These concern questions about the real 
nature of such shifts, the extent to which 
they are fundamental in nature and the 
extent to which they involve radical as 
opposed to gradual change (earthquakes 
versus stalactite formation). They also 
concern the extent to which both older 
theory about the behaviour of key inter-
est groups and later theory about the key 
role of actors as agents of change need to 
be embraced within the concept of para-
digm shift.
But above all it has been argued that 
the paradigm shift theory almost inevi-
tably involves interpretation after the 
event. It is not easy to review a policy de-
bate and proceed to predictions about 
changes that will occur. In that sense, the 
contemporary situation has been exa-
mined asking questions about what evi-
dence there is that a shift is occurring 
or will occur. In such a situation it is not 
easy for an author to be detached. We 
have views about what we think should 
occur. In this respect I believe that a ra-
dical shift is needed. But I would be step-
ping outside my comfort zone into ma-
cro-economic controversy if I were to try 
to justify that interpretation of trends in 
contemporary economies and try to ar-
gue that it will become inevitable or es-
sential. Generations of radical analysts 
who have, at various points in history, 
argued that a fundamental crisis of capi-
talism is about to occur offer a warning 
against such boldness.
The theory used here, stressing the 
need to see policy change as a product 
both of crises and of human agency in 
response to those, suggests that the ad-
vocates and potential agents of fun-
damental change would need to get a 
great deal stronger than they are now 
for this to happen. A democratic politics 
in which the public expect the govern-
ment to manage the economy, and make 
their choices between parties in terms of 
not just their capacity to do this but also 
of their ability to deliver increments of 
growth, seems unlikely to change. The 
rise of new parties peddling simplistic 
remedies, particularly those that see our 
economic problems as deriving from 
























larly to social-democratic politicians. In 
a sense, the paradigm shift theory, with 
its stress on the need for ideas to shift 
policy orthodoxies, but also its recogni-
tion that this has to be reinforced by en-
dogenous change – new interests need to 
be emerging to help carry the argument 
– can be seen as a new ‘dismal science’, 
sceptical about the feasibility of policy 
problem solving. In any case, change will 
be slow – no earthquake is occurring – 
and perhaps the most optimistic view is 
that new realities may have to come to 
be accepted.
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Razmišljanja o politici ekonomske krize 
iz perspektive policy procesa
SAŽETAK  Članak se koristi teorijom promjene paradigme da bi istražio različite pristupe 
zadnjoj ekonomskoj krizi. Dolazi se do dvaju zaključaka, konceptualnog i supstancijalnog. 
Pokazuje se da je teško primijeniti teoriju promjene paradigme u analizi događaja gdje su 
promjene politika spore, te kada je sud o tome je li do promjene došlo ili nije moguć tek 
retrospektivno. No teorija promjene paradigme može nam pomoći da objasnimo odgo-
vore na krizu u kojima se javljaju poteškoće u primjeni prevladavajućih ekonomskih ideja, 
ali i otpor njihovoj promjeni. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  teorija promjene paradigme, ekonomska kriza, policy proces
